The emission cap deadlocks a new Orbit at zero
unsolved
Emissions to a pool are capped at its prior epoch’s fee revenue times a multiple. A pool that has just launched earned nothing last epoch, so its cap is zero, so it receives no emissions, so it attracts no liquidity, so it earns nothing. The cap is the right idea — inflation should follow activity — and as written it forbids the first epoch of every pool it protects. A genesis exemption fixes it and reopens the hole the cap was closing.
The same cap pays for fake volume
unsolved
The cap’s base is fee revenue, and fee revenue is manufacturable by trading against yourself. Spending one unit of fees unlocks cap_multiple units of emission eligibility, so for any multiple above 1× it is directly profitable to wash-trade your own pool up to its cap. A guardrail against paying for activity that does not exist becomes a subsidy for inventing it.
A bounded emission rate is not a bounded supply
stated
A perpetual tail that emits r × supply each epoch gives supply × (1+r) per epoch — geometric growth with no maximum. The tail bounds the rate, not the total, and describing it as a supply cap is arithmetically false. Orrery publishes the rate and does not claim a cap.
A rate is meaningless without its period
unset
A tail bounded at 1–100 bps per epoch spans 0.5% to 67% annual inflation depending only on how long an epoch is. Epoch length is the single most consequential number in the emission design and it is unset, so every rate quoted beside it is currently uninterpretable. It is at the top of the Almanac for that reason.
NAV marks at the pool’s own price
unsolved
Mint and redeem both price off the spot the pool reports, with no TWAP, no external oracle, no deviation band and no staleness check. That is the standard manipulable-vault configuration: move the price in one transaction, mint or redeem at the distorted mark, move it back. The guard is not designed.
A locked position can be sold with its boost intact
unsolved
Locking removes the right to redeem and not the right to transfer, and the boost is keyed to the term originally chosen rather than the term remaining. Both rules are deliberate and together they create a secondary market in remaining lock time, with no recalculation for the buyer and no mechanism describing how it should clear. It follows directly from two rules written down above and neither of them anticipates it.
The privacy argument rests on a solver set that does not exist
unsolved
Everything Transit claims depends on solvers competing. There is no registration, no bond, no slashing condition, no minimum count and no anti-collusion rule. With a single solver, "best price wins" is a tautology; with a colluding few it is worse than the public mempool, because the collusion cannot be observed.